Cattle, Trade, and Clandestine Slaughter
in Oaxaca, Mexico:
Securing High Profits through
Malfeasance and Dissemblance of Information

Daniel Beams
Department of Anthropology
University of Kentucky

Please do not quote from this paper without permission from the author.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how cattle traders in Oaxaca, Mexico secure high profits through knowledge about the contested value of cattle/beef as a commodity and through malfeasance and dissemblance of information in the marketplace. Several unique characteristics of cattle allow traders to earn more from the transaction than is possible with other types of commodities. First, the use value and exchange value of cattle vary depending on the annual agricultural production cycle, the life cycle of the animal, and market demand. Cattle can be at the same time both a means of production (i.e. draft power or dairy production), and a product being produced for consumption. If during the negotiation, the producer primarily takes use value into account, but the trader sells the beef for its exchange value, a large profit may be earned. Second, the value of an individual animal is subjective because its weight and health are hard to determine in the field and because market prices fluctuate. A trader who can accurately estimate the value of an animal, but convince the producer otherwise has an advantage in the negotiation. Third, the indivisibility of an animal makes it difficult for the producer to effectively market it for consumption. Fourth, after the animal is butchered, the past history (and previous value) of the animal is easily masked. In Oaxaca, local cattle traders travel throughout the valley seeking to purchase cattle from peasant farmers at below market price, which they transport to the city to slaughter and to sell in urban markets. In order to maximize profits, traders will often buy old, sick, or dead animals with low use value and often no exchange value (because government regulations do not allow the slaughter or sale of sick or dead animals). The cattle are slaughtered clandestinely in the city and sold illegally in markets where the quality of the meat can be disguised (i.e. restaurants, sausage makers, or public institutions). This activity is tolerated only because inspectors are easily bribed. Traders can regularly double their investment in several hours. Introduction The purpose of this paper is to examine how cattle traders in Oaxaca, Mexico secure high profits through knowledge about the contested value of cattle/beef as a commodity and through malfeasance and dissemblance of information in the marketplace. The fieldwork on which this paper is based was carried out in the summer of 1988. Ethnographic data were collected through participant observation and interviews at all levels of the marketing system. This case study illustrates the entrepreneurial role of middlemen in the market economies of developing nations. It is presented in the context of the larger theoretical debate in economic anthropology concerning equity and power in the production and distribution of petty commodities in the formal and informal sectors of the economy. Informal Economy The informal economy (sometimes called unofficial, black, or underground) is defined as incomegenerating activities that are "unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated" (Castells and Portes 1989:12). This does not imply economic dualism or social marginality. There are strong linkages between formal and informal sectors. The informal sector of the economy exists because of inefficiencies in the formal economy. In the ideal market economy there would be no regulation of any kind and the distinction between formal and informal would disappear (Castells and Portes 1989:13). It is difficult to measure or even identify informal economic activity because it is intricately linked to the formal economy and often clandestine. The number of people employed in the informal economy in Latin America is estimated to be 30% to 50% (Castells and Portes 1989:17). The nature of the linkage between the formal and the informal economy is hotly debated. NeoMarxists of the political economy school stress how the informal economy is subordinated to and exploited by the formal sector. According to theorists such as Moser (1978) and Portes and Walton (1981), the formal sector is given preferential treatment by governments, while the labor force of the informal sector is used as a means to reduce production costs by paying less than it costs to reproduce labor (Murphy 1990; Roberts 1990). As discussed by Hollier (1985) and Scott (1985), many economists argue the opposite, that traders (operating in or out of the formal economy) are able to exploit market inefficiencies and earn excessive profit margins. Rather than adopting a specific ideological stance regarding the nature of the relationship between formal and informal sectors or making normative judgments about margins of profit, as many researchers do, this paper emphasizes the heterogeneous nature of informal economic enterprises and focuses on contextualizing the economic process. There may be substantial income differences between informal shop owners, market traders, domestic servants, and day laborers. It is imperative that the researcher evaluate the specific nature of the relations of production. The formal model of neoclassical economics attempts to do this through a rational choice model of individual action. This model assumes individuals or firms are profit maximizing, that they are perfectly competitive, and that information regarding prices and quality is freely available. The presence of an informal economy indicates that these hypothetical conditions do not reflect reality. Neoclassical economists would argue that people participate in the informal sector as a way to reduce transaction costs and avoid taxation. Although some activities may be illegal, many are performed within the informal sector simply because it is more efficient to do so. Economic Action Contextualized As a criticism of the neoclassical model, Granovetter argues that it fails to account for how economic action is embedded within a network of social relations (1992a, 1992b). The neoclassical model assumes trust and malfeasance are not problems because perfect competition forces market participants to be honest. Contrary to neoclassical assumptions, information is not freely available. Granovetter states that people engage in a network of social relations in order to seek better information and reduce risk through trusted trading partners. These cultivated relationships are, or often become, manystranded, departing from a purely economic relationship. Thus, not all actions may appear to be economically rational in the short run. Ironically, Granovetter points out that while these social relationships are a necessary condition for trust, they may also create an opportunity for malfeasance. There are three reasons for this: 1) Given an implicit trust, it becomes easier to deceive one's partners because they do not expect it; 2) Force and fraud are more easily pursued in teams that require a level of internal trust (i.e. elaborate schemes of kickbacks and bid rigging); and 3) Malfeasance and disorder may occur on a larger scale when social networks are complex enough to mobilize a substantial number of allies (Granovetter 1992b:5863). Because the ultimate purpose of creating social networks is to reduce transaction costs and improve one's position in the market, participants in the market may operate within or outside the formal economy. Formal rules governing transactions favor some individuals while at times disfavoring others. If the rewards of participating in the informal sector are greater than the risks of sanction, then the informal sector will continue to be an important sector of the economy. In discussing peasant market systems, Geertz (1992) analyzes the role of information, communication, and knowledge in exchange processes. He states that in a peasant market system information is poor, scarce, maldistributed, inefficiently communicated, and intensely valued. . . The level of ignorance about everything from product quality and going prices to market possibilities and production costs is very high, and much of the way in which the [peasant market system] functions can be interpreted as an attempt to reduce such ignorance for someone, increase it for someone, or defend someone against it. . . The search for information one lacks and the protection of information one has is the name of the game. (Geertz 1992:227). Along with control of capital resources, power is gained and maintained through the control of information. The most persistent concerns are with the price and quality of goods. In market transactions, one desires to know as much as possible about the price and quality of the good in question, while trading with someone who does not know as much, but who believes that they do (Geertz 1992:228). Thus, we can see the importance of obtaining trustworthy information from reliable social networks, while at the same time developing competitive clientship relations. "Clientelization represents an actorlevel attempt to counteract, and profit from, the systemlevel deficiencies of the [market system]" (Geertz 1992:229). Institutional particularities of a peasant market system make accurate information valuable when bargaining over price and quantity. Peasant market systems are characterized by extreme heterogeneity of products, and often, nonstandardized measures. "In a system where little is packaged or regulated, and everything is approximate, the possibilities for bargaining along nonmonetary dimensions are enormous" (Geertz 1992: 230). Analysis of the distribution of information is not only important in "inefficient" peasant markets. Alexander (1992) critiques neoclassical economics for not recognizing how information about product quality is disguised even in developed consumer markets. In these markets quality is often concealed by packaging and prices are fixed. Uninformed buyers confront sellers who possess an expert's knowledge of the products quality and cost. Search costs to find the best price may be too great to justify the expense and consumers have little or no bargaining power in relation to the seller (Alexander 1992). Preston (1992) considers the neoclassical paradigm an ideological construct that obscures the nature of power in market negotiations, giving the advantage to producers over consumers. Hence, it is imperative that economic anthropology study the distribution of information within market relations. The Cultural Biography of Beef In order to examine how knowledge and the control of information can affect market transactions, this paper addresses the commoditization of beef as it is transformed from an animal in the field to a steak on the table. In discussing the "cultural biography of things," Kopytoff (1986) asks how a thing's use and value may change with its position in its production/distribution life cycle. "A culturally informed economic biography of an object would look at it as a culturally constructed entity, endowed with culturally specific meanings, and classified and reclassified into culturally constituted categories" (Kopytoff 1986:68). Commoditization is the process of a thing becoming exchangeable for more and more things (Kopytoff 1986: 73). In a competitive market economy, it is assumed that everything is perfectly exchangeable with everything else through set market prices; however, the culturally defined value of a commodity may be contested depending on the form the commodity takes during certain segments of its life cycle. "Large gaps in knowledge of the ultimate market by the producer are usually conducive to high profits in trade" (Appadurai 1986:42). Likewise, gaps in knowledge about the history and quality of the good by the consumer may be conducive to high profits for the trader. For example, to determine the value of a cow being used on a farm for traction or dairy production, the owner must consider the cow's use value as a means of production, its exchange value as the product of production, and the transaction costs associated with maintaining it or selling it on the market. While the use value of an animal is known, the market value of the animal is contestable because the weight and health of the animal is not easily determined in the field. After the animal is slaughtered the quality and quantity of meat is more easily determined, but after even further processing, information concerning its past history (and therefore quality) may be disguised. The following case study illustrates how cattle traders in Oaxaca, Mexico are able to, with little capital investment, secure high profits in the informal economy through: 1) intimate knowledge of the production, distribution, and consumption life cycle of beef, 2) manipulation of client relations and bargaining power within an instituted social network, and 3) through malfeasant behavior and dissemblance of information. The specific problems addressed in this case include: 1) How traders are able to extract such high rates of profit; 2) How traders bar entry into the industry, thus maintaining high profit margins; 3) Why cattle traders show few signs of capital accumulation despite high returns on investment; and 4) The effects of clandestine trading on producers and consumers of beef. Cattle Production and Trade in Oaxaca Production Oaxaca, located in southern Mexico, lends its name to a state, a highland valley, and a city of approximately 300,000 inhabitants. Beef production is largely limited to smallscale peasant producers who own an average of four or five cows and who rarely own more than 15 head unless they operate a commercial dairy (Bolaños 1988). Raising livestock is an integral part of this smallscale production. Oxen are used for traction in the fields and to transport goods to and from market. Cows are often kept for milk production. Pigs, sheep, and goats are raised along with cattle as a way to employ family labor and turn agricultural residues into marketable commodities. Livestock are valuable assets that protect one's capital accumulation against inflation and that can readily be converted into cash when needed. Thus, cattle have both an explicit use value and exchange value on peasant smallholdings. Cattle are both a means of production and the product of a production process. Buying and selling cattle are integral parts of the yearly peasant production cycle. Oxen are used to plow fields from May (before the rainy season starts) until the end of June. In July and August after the planting is complete, oxen are no longer needed and are often sold. The season just before the harvest is financially hard for peasant producers because last year's food supplies are usually depleted. With money from the sale of cattle, peasants are able to buy several young oxen and still have money remaining to purchase household staples, livestock fodder, and pay for other expenses until the new crop is harvested. Young oxen are smaller and eat less fodder, so they cost less to maintain than large ones. When the oxen are needed in the field the following year, they will be large enough to do the work. Market System The peasant market system in Oaxaca has been well documented by Malinowski and de la Fuente (1957), Beals (1975), and Cook and Diskin (1976). The division of labor in this market system is complex and highly differentiated. Production and exchange are specialized on an intra and intercommunity basis. In the valley of Oaxaca there are eight secondary markets that meet in district capitals on a rotating basis throughout the week and a primary market in Oaxaca City where the main market day is Saturday (but is open everyday of the week). There are two main market areas in Oaxaca City (the old market in the center of town and a new market at the city edge) and many smaller shopping districts dispersed throughout the city where meat and other food commodities are sold. Previous Oaxacan market studies have broadly defined how the market system operates on a regional level, but none have specifically analyzed the production, distribution, and consumption of beef. The distribution of cattle in the valley is intimately linked to this integrated market system. Associated with every secondary market is a live cattle market. Peasants from surrounding rural districts bring in cattle they wish to sell, and traders, mostly from Oaxaca City, come to buy cattle they will slaughter and sell in the city. Transaction costs associated with selling cattle in the official markets are high because peasant producers must often walk great distances with their livestock and taxes must be paid after the exchange. Many transactions occur in the informal economy away from official markets. To lower transaction costs, cattle traders often travel directly to peasant producers' villages and homesteads, thereby paying a price below the market value of an animal. The dynamics of these transactions will be discussed in detail in a following section. Livestock are slaughtered and beef is sold in openair market stalls, called carnicerías, in secondary and urban markets. There are no regulations concerning how animals are slaughtered in secondary market districts; however, for meat to be legally sold in the central urban district of Oaxaca City, animals must be slaughtered in one of three official slaughter houses and the meat inspected and stamped. It is illegal to purchase uninspected meat in secondary markets and transport it into the city. This frequently occurs, however, because consumers believe meat in secondary markets is of better quality than in urban markets because there are fewer middlemen and transaction costs between the producer and the consumer. The cost per kilo may be the same in secondary markets as in urban markets, but since carnicería owners in secondary markets often raise the animals or buy them directly from the producer and do their own slaughtering, they are able to offer better quality meat than in urban markets and still earn a competitive profit. Because there are more middlemen in the chain of distribution between rural producers and urban consumers transaction costs are higher. Regatones are rural livestock traders who buy livestock from peasant producers in their village and hold them to sell either in the secondary cattle markets, or to livestock traders, called tablajeros, from Oaxaca City. Tablajeros travel throughout rural districts looking for livestock that they can slaughter and resell in the urban markets. They generally own pickup trucks and purchase one or two animals at a time. Tablajeros develop a network of regular clients from whom they buy, preferring to deal directly with peasant producers. But if they cannot find animals at an agreeable price they may purchase livestock from regatones or from the secondary markets at prices that do not afford them as high a profit margin as they would like. In the city, tablajeros have the animals slaughtered at an official slaughter house for a small fee and then resell the constituent parts to various clients. The carcass is cut into quarters and sold to carnicerías, restaurants, sausage makers, etc. The head, feet, and viscera are sold to middle marketers who clean and sell these parts informally in the market or to curbside restaurateurs for making tacos, and the hide is sold to local tanners. Approximately 100 cows a day are consumed in Oaxaca City. Most of these cows come from peasant production in the valley of Oaxaca (Primer Congreso... 1988). Many beef cattle are produced in southern Mexico, but they bypass the valley of Oaxaca because transportation costs through the mountains are high and better transportation routes and markets can be found along the coastal plains and in Mexico City, which daily consumes 8000 head of cattle (Farm Leader... 1988:7). Because tablajeros have high transaction costs, they seek to increase their profit by purchasing poorer quality animals at lower prices, but reselling the meat at regular market prices. They are able to do this because the quality of the beef cannot easily be disguised after it is butchered. There is no grading of meat based on the quality of the animal it has come from. When livestock are bought in the secondary markets, slaughtered in the official slaughter houses, and sold in open markets, transactions throughout the distribution cycle take place within the formal sector of the economy. However, there are great incentives for tablajeros to operate partially or wholly within the informal sector of the economy. When tablajeros buy livestock directly from peasant producers in rural areas, they are operating within the informal sector because they avoid paying taxes and the transaction is not recorded. Once in the city they may reenter the formal sector by slaughtering and marketing the beef through official channels. Tablajeros who do not slaughter their animals through official channels, but clandestinely in their homes, are called clandestinas. Many tablajeros operate clandestinely when the necessity or opportunity arises. Clandestine slaughter will be discussed more thoroughly in a latter section. The Union de Tablajeros del Estado is a state wide association of tablajeros in Oaxaca, claiming several hundred members, which works for the rights of and controls the actions of tablajeros (Solución al Desabasto... 1988:4). The exact number of tablajeros operating in the valley of Oaxaca could not be estimated. A key informant who often operates as a clandestine slaughterer estimated that fifteen families in Oaxaca City operate as clandestinas at least part time. Trading Practices Data for this case study were primarily obtained through intensive participant observation with the Garcías, an extended family of tablajeros/clandestinas, and their clients and associates.1 I was introduced to Amador García Lopez through his daughter, a journalist whom I met by accident while simultaneously seeking an interview with a government official concerning the beef trade. Amador is a tablajero, as was his father and grandfather. The García family originally came from the town of Tlacolula about 30 kilometers from Oaxaca. There are now 250 García family members living in Oaxaca. Twenty of Amador's male kinsman are tablajeros, and many other family members own carnicerías. The García family is well known throughout Oaxaca for being involved in many aspects of the cattle industry. Amador learned the trade of tablajero from his father and by working in the slaughterhouse for fifteen years. He has been a tablajero for 33 years. Amador and his wife, Elva, have eight children, four boys and four girls between the ages of 11 and 26, all but one living at home. The second oldest son, Javier, lives with his wife and child in a small house at the back of the family compound. Only one of the four boys have graduated from high school. Two boys dropped out early to become tablajeros and the fourth is only eleven. Javier, who is 19, does much of the cattle buying along with his father. Amador and the boys do not think a formal education is necessary to be successful in life. All four of the girls are still in school. Alicia is in college studying journalism and is planning to become a lawyer. The second oldest graduated from high school this year and is planning to attend college in the coming year. The two youngest girls are in junior high. Their mother, Elva, is well educated and works as an independent real estate investor. Elva is striving to give her girls an education so they can rise above their current socioeconomic condition. The Garcías live in a neighborhood, called a colonia, off of a main boulevard on the outskirts of town. The house is constructed in a style typical for Oaxaca. The main house is made of concrete blocks, stuccoed, and painted a bright blue. The kitchen, bathroom, and bedrooms open to a central patio. The living room is large and breezy with many windows and open doorways. The entire living compound is larger than average and enclosed by a high wall studded with broken glass around the top. Other than the main house, the living compound consists of the married son's house, four rent rooms, several large fruit trees, pig stalls, a small muddy corral to stable cows, and a patio for doing laundry and butchering livestock. Elva raises pigs at the back of the lot. She either feeds them scraps from their table or slop she buys from a restaurant down the street. She refuses to sell her pigs to her husband or sons when they are large enough to slaughter because she says they will not give her a fair price. Elva said she earns all the money for the family food and for her girls. She and her husband keep their money separate because she said the men spend everything they earn on "liquor, poker and women." Tablajeros Amador owns an old Volkswagen and his son Javier has a mid1970s Ford pickup with high rails on the sides. Javier and Amador work together looking for cows to purchase. They buy livestock from dairies, peasant producers, and markets within a 50 kilometer radius of their home. Amador said that years ago they had a larger truck, but lost it in a poker game. They hope to buy a larger one soon, but for now they can only transport one or two cows at a time so they stay closer to home. The García's concentrate their search for cattle in about ten different pueblos around the valley. Amador knows the countryside and pueblos intimately and constantly recounts bits of trivia about the people and the agriculture. To illustrate what transpires during an average work day for tablajeros, in the following section I describe a day in the field with Amador and Javier García. At 6:30 on a weekday morning we all climbed in the VW and sped off to a local military installation. The Garcías have a special contract with the military to provide all of their beef. The post was heavily guarded and at the main entrance a soldier got in the car and escorted us to one of the military battalions. The captain in charge of kitchen purchasing met us quite energetically. He and the Garcías seemed to be good friends. After a lengthy discussion they established that more beef was needed at the battalion that day. The captain paid them for meat the García's had delivered several days earlier. Amador said he prefers to deal in cash so no records have to be kept or taxes paid. Amador said the military contract is a good one because the military will accept very low quality beef and still pay regular prices. Amador said the captain is willing to accept low grade meat because he gives the captain high quality steaks for free. Amador said he and the captain do favors for each other whenever possible. While we were there the captain told Amador about a large refrigerator good for storing beef that Amador could get cheap. Amador told the captain about a nice piece of real estate he had for sale. We all shook hands while Amador promised to return later that afternoon with fresh beef. Amador had purchased an old dairy cow the night before for $220, and when we arrived home some other tablajeros were waiting to buy the animal.2 Amador and the tablajeros discussed the price for some time, finally coming to an agreement of $290 paid in cash. Amador said he could have made more if he had slaughtered the cow, but since the men were there and ready to buy, he could not resist a hasslefree $70 profit. Later that morning I accompanied Javier as he drove the VW several blocks to an urban dairy. It is owned, Javier explained, by a rich Spaniard who has over 300 cows. We walked around a stall holding three very skinny cows. Javier carefully surveyed the ugliest one of the bunch, which had a grotesquely bloated stomach. He pulled hard on its tail until it staggered and nearly fell. Javier offered the Spaniard $130. At first the Spaniard wanted $260, but they finally reached an agreement of $175. Before returning home we stopped at a small community marketplace where Javier's aunt operates a carnicería. Javier asked if she needed any fresh beef that day. She did and they agreed on a quantity to be delivered later and price. While Javier returned with the pickup to retrieve the cow at the dairy, I accompanied Amador in the VW as he scouted for cows in several pueblos near Etla, a rural district adjacent to Oaxaca. First we stopped at another familyowned carnicería to buy some fresh beef. Amador explained that to be a tablajero one has to be clever. He indicated that he would give this meat as presents to the campesinosrural peasant producershe visited that day. This is smart business, he said, because whether they have any cows for sale today or not, they will remember him when they do have cows for sale. We drove another thirty minutes to the small rural village of Santa Marta where several hundred people live interspersed among cultivated fields. We stopped at the first house. The men were not home, so we left a bag of meat with the women and headed on to a second house. Again, the men were out in the fields working. The women explained that it had just started raining and all the men in the community were out planting corn. After exchanging pleasantries for a while, Amador gave the women some fresh meat and they quickly gathered together some homemade tortillas. The oldest woman petitioned her grandson to help us to find the men in the fields. After a ten minute walk down a narrow muddy trail we met a man and his son who were plowing with a stout pair of oxen. The older one walked over, greeting us at the edge of the field. This campesino did not know Amador, but neither was he surprised to see him. He and Amador discussed the price of his oxen. The campesino wanted $670.00 dollars for each of them. The campesino also had four dairy cows, but they were not yet old enough to sell. The reason, the campesino said, the oxen are so expensive is because he still needs them in the fields. In another month he could let them go more cheaply. Amador thanked him but said he could not do business with them right now. We left on good terms and in good cheer. Amador said he never bargained too hard to begin with because he likes to leave the door open for later negotiations. We walked back to the house with the grandson where the women were waiting. After serving us a platter of fruit and conversing about our plans for the day, three young women and the grandson piled into the VW and we headed to another pueblo five kilometers down the road. We arrived at one of the nicer houses in the community and were greeted by a woman. Amador asked if she had any cows for sale. She said she did and led us up a hill behind the house to where a bull was tied to a tree. Amador remarked confidently to me that the carcass weighed 210 kilograms. He said tablajeros must be able to accurately estimate the amount of meat on an animal to know what it is worth. He and the woman could not come to an agreement on the price, so Amador said he would come back later when her husband was home. Amador told me he was sure he would come back with the pickup and get it, but if he waited to close the deal he would get a better price. Upon leaving, the woman gathered us an apron full of peaches from a tree in the front yard and wished us a happy journey. Amador informed me that this lady was a regatona. Her prices are a little higher, but she almost always has cattle for sale. Before driving back to Oaxaca we stopped and gave three women who were waiting for the bus a ride to the market in Oaxaca City. Amador explained how important confianzagood connectionsis to his business. Amador seems to know everyone on the streets in Oaxaca City. He waves to all the other cattle drivers and tablajeros we pass. He calls the traffic cops by name. He has to pay regular bribes to the police because he transports so many cattle into the city that he should be paying taxes but does not. He said he knows hundreds of campesinos from whom he buys cows. He is also good friends with the owners of the private slaughterhouse in the colonia Reforma Agraria and with the "Registrar of Livestock" in the state of Oaxaca. To be a successful tablajero one has be able to manipulate people. Later I went with Javier to pick up the carcass at the slaughterhouse. Javier took each side of beef and cut it into four pieces with an ax and threw the pieces into the dirty pickup bed. We drove back to the military installation to deliver the beef. The beef, which was weighted on a large kitchen scale, came to 196 kilograms. The captain paid Javier $1.75 per kilogram for a total of $343. After Javier sells the viscera he will make a profit of over $200 for several hour's work. After dropping me off, Javier returned to the slaughterhouse to play poker with his friends and recently garnered wages, thus concluding a day's work. Amador has several methods of purchasing cows. On one occasion we went to visit a family in the pueblo of La Raya who might have a pair of oxen for sale. The man of the house was working in the fields with the oxen, so Amador agreed to come back later in the evening. On the way back out of the pueblo Javier drove while Amador leaned out the window yelling, "¿Se vende yuntas?, ¿Se vende toros?, Se vende animales?," asking if anyone had any livestock for sale. I found this amusing and was wondering if it ever worked when a lady came running out of her house waving at us to come back. We walked through a gate to a large complex where several families lived. Amador spoke with the lady who waved him down. She had two pigs, one burro, a pair of oxen, a cow, and a calf. She was selling one of the pigs for $310. Amador halfheartedly offered her $155. They could not compromise on the pig. The lady really wanted to sell the dairy cow. Her original asking price was $450, Amador offered $225 and she came down to $360. Amador told me he really wanted to buy all four cows at once so he could get a better deal. Her firm offer for all four was $1550. Amador would not go higher than $1100. He confided that if he waited a day or two she would come down to his price. It was interesting to watch Amador bargain. The owner talked about how fat and healthy the animals were. Amador countered by saying they were ugly and skinny, and that they had bloated stomachs. Amador told her that at her price he would lose money on the cows if he butchered them. An ancientlooking man came outside and insisted that the dairy cow was not his granddaughter's, but rather it belonged to him and he would not take less than $36. His granddaughter indicated that he was crazy by twirling her finger around her ear. Amador said even he would never buy the cow for just $36 because that would be robbery. When we got back on the road Amador did not yell anymore, but another woman stepped out of her house and said she would have one for him if he would come back in August. Trader's Profit Margins The number of cows Amador slaughters per week varies greatly depending on the availability of cattle in the valley. He said this year cows are scarce because of a severe drought during the past two years. In a normal year he would slaughter an average of 10 to 12 cows a week. Amador said he tries to buy all of a campesino's cows at one time because he gets a better deal with fewer hassles. He can increase his profit with the least amount of time invested. It is also more efficient to buy large fat cows because he makes more profit per animal. He said many times the price of fat cows is higher per kilogram than the skinny sick cows, therefore, even though it is more work, he buys the skinny cows. Amador figures his labor and that of his family is essentially free. He always looks for the cheapest beef per kilogram so he can make the largest profit. Almost every cow I saw him buy was a poorlooking, sickly animal, or already dead. Considering the small investment of both capital and time, the profit made from being a intermediary cattle trader can be great. Based on a national study, cattle traders in Mexico earn an average of $380 per head if they buy the cow from the producer, slaughter it, and sell the meat to a retailer (Introductores en Mexico 1988). This figure was higher than what I observed in Oaxaca. Tablajeros in the valley of Oaxaca pay on average slightly more for peasant produced cattle than do traders in the major cattle producing regions. The average price for live cattle in Oaxaca is approximately $1.10/kg and the average price for which beef is sold to a carnicería varies between $2.00 and $2.50/kg depending on the grade of the meat. If tablajeros in Oaxaca make a profit of $1.10/kg from a carcass and an average profit of $60 on the viscera, head, legs, and hide, then they make a total profit of $280 for a 200 kilogram cow. Profit may vary because it is always a guess as to how many kilograms of beef are on each cow. The more accurately a tablajero can estimate the weight of a cow, and the more convincingly he can convince the owner otherwise, the more profit he stands to make. The price of live cattle varies greatly depending on how badly the campesino needs the animals in the field or how badly the campesino needs cash. For a single transaction, I saw Amador make as little as $90 on a scrawny dairy cow and as much as $1350 on two pair of oxen. If the average tablajero sells 10 cows a week at $250 profit per cow then he will earn $2500 a week. Based on these projected profits, a tablajero typically earns more in one week than what an average laborer earns in over two years (in 1988 minimum wage was $3.50 a day). This projected average income does not include transaction costs, which will be discussed in a following section. Clandestine Activities The above profit estimates were calculated based strictly on tablajeros operating legally. As Amador describes, even greater profits can be earned slaughtering cattle clandestinely. The homes of most tablajeros make good cover for clandestine slaughtering because the typical courtyard in Mexico is usually hidden behind the house or enclosed by a high wall topped with fragments of broken glass. The only equipment essential for operating a clandestine beef operation are running water and a knife. Amador had running water, but his back yard had poor drainage, so the blood and other wastes became a foul smelling stagnant pool beneath Elva's pigs. Most tablajeros learned their trade in the municipal slaughterhouses before beginning to buy and sell livestock, so naturally they already possess the skills necessary to butcher a cow in their own backyard. The fee for having a cow slaughtered in the municipal slaughterhouse is slightly over three dollars (Hernández 1988). When a tablajero makes over $250 a cow, three dollars seems to be a nominal fee. Why would a tablajero want to go to the trouble of butchering a cow himself (several hours work) when for just over one percent of the expected profit he can have someone else do the butchering? Some tablajeros operate as clandestine slaughterers when they have a cow to slaughter or when they have promised to fill an order, but for some reason the municipal slaughterhouse is not open. In 1987 the main municipal slaughterhouse was closed an average of six days, and as many as eleven days, each month. Except for Saturdays, tablajeros are never sure when the slaughterhouse will be open. If a tablajero has promised beef to a customer on a certain day and finds the slaughterhouse closed, he may slaughter the cow himself rather than miss a business transaction. Because of health hazards, municipal slaughterhouses will not slaughter an animal if it has severe intestinal parasites or tuberculosis, or if it died before arriving at the slaughter house. If a tablajero buys a diseased or dead cow he will not take it to the municipal slaughterhouse because he knows it will be turned away, instead he butchers the animal in his own home. Since all beef sold within the city limits of Oaxaca is required to have a stamp of inspection, a clandestine slaughterer must be selective in marketing his uninspected meat. The open marketplace is out of the question because meat is hanging in public view where the stamp can be seen. Plus, the markets are the first places city health inspectors look for uninspected beef. Clandestinas must find a place to sell their beef where it is not seen until it is altered in some manner so that consumers and inspectors cannot tell if it was originally inspected. Most clandestinas have secretive informal contracts with restaurants, hotels, or institutions (both private and public), who prepare the beef and serve it directly to the public. Clandestinely slaughtered beef may command a slightly lower price than beef on the open market, but then dead cows do not cost nearly as much as live ones. Everyone in Oaxaca whispers about clandestinas in Oaxaca who are flooding the beef market with contaminated meat. Because clandestinas operate within the informal economy, it is hard to estimate to what extent they affect quality of beef on the market. In an interview in El Imparcial, a Oaxacan newspaper, the administrator of a municipal slaughterhouse in Oaxaca said he knows there is a problem with clandestinas in Oaxaca, but since clandestinas are hidden he could not determine the extent of the problem (CruzGarcía 1988, p. 1). Ironically, the reporter who performed the interview is Alicia, the daughter Amador García, one of the most well known clandestinas in Oaxaca. From Amador I was able to learn more about clandestine slaughtering than I was through the city officials from whom clandestinas are hidden. Amador said the fifteen or so families who operate clandestinely, know and look out for one another. Based on my summer of field work, I estimate that Amador slaughters approximately one third of his animals clandestinely. If the city has a structure for controlling illegal meat and clandestine slaughter operations, why are clandestinas and uninspected meat such a problem in Oaxaca? The two health inspectors assigned to meat inspection attempt cover the market transactions of over 300,000 people. They are able to inspect only one sector of the city a day. The inspectors main strategy for controlling the exchange of uninspected beef is by the threat of a surprise inspection. The real reason health officials cannot control the problem, however, is because the inspectors are readily corruptible. An experience I shared with Javier illustrates just how easily this is done. One morning as Javier was carrying home a dead cow in the back of the pickup, one of the health inspectors saw him and followed him home. He calmly drove the truck through his gate and shut it behind him. Several minutes later he walked out into the street to talk with the inspector. After a friendly chat and an exchange of several dollars, the inspector drove off. Javier said he did not know of any clandestinas who had the ability to stamp their own meat, but if an inspector came around you could certainly pay him to do so, even if it would not have passed inspection at the slaughterhouse. Amador said the health inspectors confiscate only enough beef to make it appear as if they are doing their job. Six hundred kilograms of beef were reported confiscated from restaurants and hotels between January and June of 1988 (Tasajo de... 1988:1). Javier assured me that this is only a small percentage of the illegal beef actually found and an even smaller percentage of the illegal beef trafficked in Oaxaca. Amador said the real skills necessary to becoming a successful clandestina are not how to butcher livestock, but how to create and maintain confianzagood connectionswith the proper people. Amador joked about having a special clandestina permit. By this he meant that, because of his contract with the military to supply beef, he has special privileges. Anytime he gets in trouble with health authorities, he calls his military friends and they bail him out. Amador always has cash on hand to bribe policemen, city officials or whoever he has to bribe to continue his clandestina operation. Mario Rolando Bolaños, secretary to the cattle program in the Rural Development Office, said there is not a problem with clandestina slaughterers in Oaxaca. Bolaños said everyone in town whose business it is knows exactly where cattle are being slaughtered illegally. Therefore, he said, these operations are not "hidden," they are just "uncontrollable." Bolaños said he knows they pay bribes to stay in business, but there is nothing the city can do because clandestinas manipulate how the system operates. Clandestinas have the confianza necessary to evade control (Bolaños 1988). Since the García family knew of my interests, they called me anytime they were slaughtering a cow in their backyard, or they would tell me later when I missed one.3 The majority of the García's clandestinely butchered cows were sold to the military, to restaurants, or to salchicheros, sausage makers who ground up the meat, disguising its original condition. Most of the animals were sick dairy cows and a few of them had even been dead for a while. Cows die by either getting in accidents (i.e. hit by a vehicle, or gored to death in a stock pen, etc.) or from poisoning when they eat a particular kind of grass. When there is little to graze on cattle sometimes eat native toxic weeds. Neurotoxins accumulate in the animal's fat and when the animal becomes active or is moved to a new pasture, the toxins are released, causing drowsiness, twitching and convulsions, followed by death. Shane estimates that cattle producers in Mexico may lose five to ten percent of their herd in this manner (1986:21). Amador said that after cows have been dead several days their stomachs become bloated, but that the meat is still fine. He buys these dead cows very cheaply, slaughters them behind his house and sells the beef as if it were regular meat. I asked if he ever had the meat inspected and he said never, but he knows it is good meat, because he does not sell carcasses from dangerously sick cows. Several days later, Alicia, Amador's daughter, described how Javier had butchered another cow at home the previous evening; making a total of three that week. This one, she said, had balls in its stomach. She said Amador and Javier thought the cow had tuberculosis. They threw away the intestines, which were partially green, but kept the meat and sold it to the military anyway. It was not their fault, she explained. How could they know the cow was sick before Javier butchered it? They could not just throw the meat away, Alicia said, because they had over one million pesos invested in it. She knew the meat might make people sick, she certainly would not eat it, but what could they do? It had to be sold. Discussion Trading Strategies Tablajeros and clandestinas secure higher than average profits from the beef trade through entrepreneurial management of knowledge concerning beef production, distribution, and consumption. Barth (1981) describes an entrepreneur as an innovator who seeks profit. "Innovation for an entrepreneur must involve the initiation of transactions which make commensurable some forms of value which were previously not directly connected" (Barth 1981:56). Barth goes on to state that The big potentialities for profit lie where the disparity of evaluation between two or more kinds of goods are greatest, and where this disparity has been maintained because there are no bridging transactions. Such disparities can persist where the goods in question belong to different spheres, and are separated by barriers to the conversion of valuesbarriers of cost imposed on such conversion through available modes of trade and production, or sanctions of shame and punishment. The successful entrepreneur bridges this barrier by designing a new type of transaction, one which circumvents or otherwise reduces the costs of the conversion and thus makes it possible to exploit the disparity of value to make profit (Barth 1981:56). I quote Barth at length because this passage so accurately describes how cattle traders secure high profits in Oaxaca. But rather than being a "disparity of evaluation between two or more kinds of goods," the disparity is between the evaluation of a single commodity, beef, whose value is transformed through various dispositions over its life cycle. As the following discussion will illustrate, tablajeros and clandestinas overcome barriers to trade between commodities belonging to differing spheres by reducing transaction costs through social networks, and through dissemblance of information and malfeasant behavior. By analyzing the social relationships along the path of distribution, between peasant producers and traders and between traders and retailers, it is possible to demonstrate how traders obtain high profits. We may begin by asking whether peasant producers act rationally when they sell livestock to traders at below a price they could obtain in the market. It is important to distinguish between use value and exchange value. Differences in livestock prices in rural areas and central markets can be attributed in part to the increased transaction costs associated with selling in the market and to a disparity in the amount of information available concerning the use value and exchange value of the animal. A report by the World Bank (1976) evaluating cattle trading practices in Tanzania concluded that a peasant producer's desire to sell at the "best price" does not necessarily mean at the highest price. Convenience, monetary needs, or maintenance of social relations may also affect transactions. By selling to traveling middlemen, peasant producers avoid the uncertainty of making a sale in the market (lost time) and of having to pay taxes on the transaction. Peasant producers possess great knowledge concerning the use value of an animal on their farm and of the cash needs of the household. When an animal's productivity drops because of timing within the annual production cycle or because of poor health, it may become more expensive to maintain the animal until it can be sold at a higher price in the market than it is to sell it immediately to a trader. Likewise, cash may be needed quickly and selling to a trader assures that the need is immediately fulfilled. Conversely, an animal's exchange value may be higher for a trader (especially a clandestina) than it is in the open market. An extremely sick cow, or a dead one, has practically no value on the farm or exchange value on the open market, but since clandestinas are able to dispose of the meat in a profitable (but illegal) manner, they are the best avenue of exchange. Because of scarce information, the exact exchange value of an animal is difficult to determine in the field. A trader's intimate connection to the slaughter industry and knowledge of current prices often gives him an advantage in determining the true exchange value. Being able to accurately estimate the weight of an animal, and thus its slaughtered value, is important to negotiating a fair trade. Amador García took pride in being able to accurately estimate an animal's slaughter value, while at the same time convincing the owner otherwise. Without an intimate knowledge of the slaughter industry (i.e. the market value of meat, viscera, hide, head, and feet) a peasant producer will underestimate the slaughtered value of an animal and will not be aware of the profit margin earned by the trader. Traders may also have greater knowledge of fluctuating beef prices due to rapid inflation. Traders living in urban areas may simply be able to capitalize on the lag time for price information to reach rural areas. The establishment of a patron/client relationship between the trader and peasant producer can greatly affect the nature of the transaction. Tablajeros in Oaxaca go to great lengths to establish a personal relationship with peasant producers that obligate them to future transactions. As illustrated by Amador García, gifts and favors are often exchanged apart from the livestock transaction. The establishment of a manystranded relationship creates trust between participants. But as Granovetter (1992b) points out, this trust may obfuscate the competitive nature of the relationship. If a client expects a patron to deal honestly, it may be easier for the patron to exploit the relationship. However, if a patron obviously deals unfairly with a client, trust may be broken and future transactions curtailed. Patron/client relationships are valuable to both parties because assured transactions reduce search costs. In Oaxaca, gift exchange was used by both cattle traders and peasant producers as a way to bind the patron/client relationship. The inequality of the gift exchange marked the inequality in power in the relationship. In the case study, Amador gave the peasants fresh cuts of meat (an expensive luxury item for peasant households) and peasants gave Amador a token amount of home produce in exchange. Ortiz suggests that through gift giving, sharing, and paternalism, patrons foster dependence and deference in their clientship relations (1992:53). By fostering this unequal relationship, traders obligate peasant producers to trade with them exclusively and perhaps at an exchange rate that the peasant believes is unfair but feels powerless to improve upon. Even though this type of patron/client relationship and better access to information may favor the trader over the producer, both parties probably improve their wellbeing by trading outside the sphere of the public market. Compared to purchasing livestock, Tablejeros have much less opportunity to use information to their advantage when selling meat in the public market. Their margin of profit is determined by how cheaply they are able to buy the meat from the producer. Carnicerías weigh their purchases, and the price they pay per kilo is relatively uniform across the market. Clandestinas, on the other hand, are able to improve their advantage when selling their meat through malfeasant behavior (illegally slaughtering livestock) and by dissembling information about quality through an intricate social network, what Amador called developing confianza. Confianza is the mechanism by which clandestinas avoid state sanction and develop the contacts necessary to market illegal meat. Granovetter (1992b) discusses how malfeasance is more easily pursued in teams that require a level of internal trust. In the case example, Amador developed trustworthy relationships with individuals in positions to receive illegal meat through gift giving and exchanging favors. In return these individuals were in a position to hide the origin of the meat from the final consumer. I do not have the data to compare the profit margins between the legal trade of tablajeros and the illegal trade of clandestinas. I surmise that clandestinas enjoy a higher rate of profit because of the greater disparity in the perceived value of the commodity between producer and consumer. Transaction Costs The net profit earned per animal is difficult to determine because of the many transactions costs that are not overtly calculated. After transaction costs are calculated, is the profit earned from livestock trading in Oaxaca appreciably greater than other types of activities operating with similar amounts of capital and labor resources? Capital investment is relatively low compared to the return on the traders investment. All that is needed is a serviceable pickup truck and several thousand dollars cash (approximately $5000 total investment). Controlling for inflation, a typical investment of $5000 dollars, generously estimated to earn 10 percent annually, would only generate $10 a week in income above the value of labor. A slaughterhouse laborer in Oaxaca in 1988 earned approximately $21 a week. Assuming equivalent skills are necessary to work as a tablajero, a typical investment of $5000 plus value added from labor would earn approximately $31 weekly. Assuming only 5 cows are slaughtered weekly for a gross profit of $250 each ($1250), do the transaction costs associated with being a tablajero or clandestina account for the difference of $1219? Even generously assuming a transaction cost of $100 per animal, the huge difference in income is still not accounted for. In the case study, Amador García lived as many middle class in Oaxaca live, but showed few signs of capital accumulation or reinvestment of profit to expand the enterprise. Nor were the profits used to maintain and reproduce the household (which was mainly accomplished by Amador's wife, Elva). The majority of his and his son's profits appear to have been spent with friends gambling, drinking, and on women other than their wives. Are these expenditures transaction costs associated with maintaining ones position as a tablajero/clandestina? I suggest that yes, in part they are; these expenditures help maintain the tight social network and confianza among peers in the industry, facilitating trust and the flow of information necessary to succeed as a tablajero or clandestina. Although, these expenditures may be in excess of what is necessary to maintain the same profit level, and would thus be considered "economically irrational" by neoclassical theorists. This behavior may be explained in several ways. First, work is not always drudgery. The benefits or costs of an action are not calculated only in economic terms, but also by the degree to which they are enjoyable. Many transaction costs associated with maintaining the tablajero/clandestina social network are considered "fun" by the participants, and in so being perhaps they are indulged in beyond necessity. This concept of seeking "fun" in combination with economic efficiency is mentioned by Ortiz (1992:49) when she discusses reasons for migration in Colombia, stating that "workers do not necessarily go to areas where they will realize a higher real wage. [Y]oung men . . . migrate out of boredom, to experience other regions, and, hopefully, to find other employment opportunities." Secondly, the culturally constructed style of household organization and gender differentiation in Oaxaca may contribute to how income is distributed and consumed. In the García family, pooled income was spent at the discretion of Elva, the female household head. In order to maintain control over personal income, the men may quickly and purposefully dispose of their income through activities that enhance their own wellbeing rather than that of their whole family. A defining aspect of maleness and a source of prestige in Mexican society (in some sectors) can be described as "machismo." Machizmo is attained through a public display of wealth, generosity, and womanizing. Perhaps machismo is more highly valued among the tablajeros and clandestinas I interviewed than is maximization of economic profit.4 Barriers to Entry Since tablajeros earn more than might be expected based on capital investment and manual labor, do they possess specialized skills or knowledge that can account for such high profit? If profit margins are so high, what prevents others from becoming tablajeros or clandestinas? Both of these questions may be addressed by discussing how information is controlled. Tablajeros and clandestinas secure high profits through specialized knowledge about, and the control of information regarding the production, distribution, and consumption of beef. Cattle traders' social networks (i.e. colleagues in the cattle trading business) are the means by which information is shared and controlled. This can be contrasted with competitive clientship relations, where information is used as a tool to increase profits. As the model of entrepreneurship predicts, we might expect cattle traders' margins of profit to diminish as others see the opportunity for high profits and enter the industry. However, the occupation of tablajero/clandestina has existed in Oaxaca for many years. The Garcías have been participating in the trade for four generations and slaughtering practices in Oaxaca City have been regulated since 1910. Barriers to entry related to the traders' social networks slow the entrance of new participants, thus helping to maintain a high level of profit. The social network required to operate as a tablajero is complex (especially for clandestinas). As the case study illustrates, the technical and social skills necessary to operate as a cattle trader are handed down in families. Fathers teach their sons the skills and perhaps even bequeath territories or social networks to their sons. Markets for clandestinely slaughtered beef are illegal, may be limited in scale, and are only accessible through manystranded networks of social relationships. In protecting the rights of traders, the Tablajeros Union of Oaxaca may function in a way that limits entrance into the industry. Persons wishing to enter the industry without a social network in place would face higher transaction costs. The lack of information regarding markets and prices, and the illegal nature of many trading activities would cost new entrants much more in lost profits and bribes or sanctions than it would for established traders or their sons. The informal nature and the complexity of trading transactions may disguise the rate of return on investment, thus disguising incentives to enter the industry. Finally, culturally constructed role prescriptions may preclude certain members of society from entering the industry. Although many women market meat in carnicerias or buy and sell constituent parts of butchered animals, I saw no women participating as tablajeros or clandestinas. Likewise, other social classes may be socially precluded from participating in these activities. Conclusion This study has demonstrated that researchers cannot simply plug numbers into a neoclassical economic formula to determine how a local economy actually operates. Economic action is embedded in cultural institutions and networks of social relationships. Profits are often made through specialized knowledge and by controlling information, features of the economy that neoclassical theory assumes are equally distributed. An economy cannot be accurately portrayed unless the effect of the distribution of power in a market is considered (access to and control over productive resourcesincluding knowledge and information) and economic action is contextualized locally. In this preliminary study, more questions have been raised than definitively answered. But this study does show that high profits may be earned in the informal economy without high capital investment. The ability of participants in the informal economy to earn an adequate income is strikingly diverse and often depends on the characteristics of the commodity being produced or sold. Tablajeros and clandestinas capitalize on the disparity in value as cattle are transformed from a means of production to a product of production. They capitalize on large gaps in knowledge about the "social life of beef" between the producer and the consumer, and vice versa. The question of whether or not cattle traders in Oaxaca are exploiting producers or consumers must be answered in the specific context of transactions. Producers would not enter into a transaction unless they felt it improved their wellbeing in some way. Often, trading sick or dead animals clandestinely is a mutually profitable transaction. Certainly the consuming public is exploited when they purchase poor quality or even dangerously unhealthy meat without realizing it; however, the majority of transactions occur through official channels where consumers are aware of the quality of meat they are purchasing. Profit is not as high for trade in commodities where knowledge is more regulated and freely exchanged. For example, within the beef industry in Oaxaca, midlevel traders who purchase viscera, head, and feet from tablajeros in the slaughterhouses control a much smaller niche in the disparity of evaluation. Buying and selling prices are relatively standardized and profit is generated from value added through labor. In one documented case, the initial investment in head, feet, and viscera was $15, and after approximately six hours of labor cleaning and marketing the product, it was sold for a profit of $6.50. This entrepreneurial enterprise earned double the minimum wage, but was not nearly as profitable as the work of tablajeros or clandestinas. Other market studies documenting the profit margins of traders trading in commodities of less subjective value demonstrate that margins of profit are not as high as in the Mexican beef industry. Gross margins of profit, as percentage of sales, in the Mexican beef trade are as high as 68 percent (Introductores en Mexico 1988). Hollier (1985) reports that net profits of palmoil traders in West Cameroon ranged between 7 and 17 percent of sales. Scott (1985) reports gross and net margins of potato traders in the Cañete valley of Peru were 13 percent and 3 percent of Lima retail prices. Culturally constructed role prescriptions (along divisions of class, ethnicity, gender) play a key role in determining who participates in what kinds of market activities. Cattle traders in Oaxaca are almost exclusively male mestizos. As documented by Babb (1985) and Seligmann (1989), less profitable types of trade are often relegated to women or other groups with subordinated interests. Babb states that vegetable and fruit sellers in Huaraz, Peru (of which 92% are women) on average earn about half the daily wage of male agricultural laborers (1985:295).

Acknowledgments. I thank the Institute of Environmental Studies of Baylor University and the National Science Foundation for financially supporting the fieldwork, conducted in the summer of 1987, which led to my master's thesis and the writing of this paper. I am especially grateful for the support and advice of Arthur P. Murphy and Martha W. Rees while conducting field research and to Thomas Hakansson for his advice while writing this paper. I am deeply indebted to the García family for making accessible the hidden structure of the cattle economy in Oaxaca.

Notes

1. Pseudonyms have been used to protect the identity of people mentioned in this paper.

2. Mexican pesos have been converted to the value of U.S. dollars in 1988.

3. Amador never personally introduced me to another clandestina family because he feared they might become suspicious of my research. However, one day as I was walking through a suburban colonia on the way back to town when I heard the familiar death squeal of a pig. I found the sound coming from behind a high wall and peered between a crack in the gate to see what was happening. A great big man was finishing the slaughtering of one pig on a patio while several others in a small pen were contemplating their fate. Not sure of the reception I would receive if I were caught, I quickly walked away, confident because I, at least briefly, had observed another clandestina operation.

4. For a similar account of high gains from trade and seemingly irrational consumption of profits in Mexico City, refer to Oscar Lewis' Children of Sanchez (1961).

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